William the Conqueror and Henry IV of Germany Part 1 – why
compare them?
In this series of posts, I’m going to do something really
quite exciting and unconventional. I’m going to compare William the Conqueror
(1027 – 1087) and Henry IV of Germany (1050 – 1106). Why is this such a radical
idea? After all, both of these eleventh century rulers were each other’s contemporaries,
though William was of an older generation. Both rulers of course knew of each
other, which wouldn’t be true if I was attempting a comparison between William the
Conqueror and the Seljuk Turkish sultan Alp Arslan (d.1072) or between Henry IV
of Germany and the Song Chinese emperor Yingzong (r.1067 – 1085).
Indeed, both had quite strong reputations in each other’s
kingdoms, and chroniclers in each kingdom followed the other kingdom’s affairs
with great interest. William of Poitiers, the Conqueror’s chief propagandist,
claimed in 1075 that when William the Conqueror was planning his invasion of
England, he sent embassies to the court of King Henry IV to secure his support
as well as to the court of Pope Alexander II, though importantly not that of William’s
notional liege lord King Philip of France. Its of course unlikely that the
embassy happened, given that William of Poitiers, a highly articulate yet
unreliable narrative historian, is our only source for it. But the fact that
William of Poitiers would make the claim at all in a work intended to praise
the Conqueror to high heaven, indicates just how esteemed Emperor Henry IV was
in England and Normandy, as he was everywhere else in Western Christendom – the
German king-emperor was the most important monarch of them all. Likewise, from
the German side, Bruno of Magdeburg, writing in 1082, claimed that in 1074 when
King Henry IV was facing a full-scale rebellion against his rule in the duchy
of Saxony, he requested that William the Conqueror send military support. William
then curtly replied that he had claimed his kingdom by violent conquest, and
that if he left it alone for too long there would be rebellions. Bruno might
have simply been relying on gossip, but it does show (and we know this from
other German chroniclers too) that the Norman Conquest of England was much
talked about in Germany – perhaps Henry IV wanted to the Normans to harry his
own rebellious North.
Indeed, even if diplomacy was quite tenuous between England/
Normandy and the German Empire at this time, they would later be joined at the hip
when William the Conqueror’s granddaughter, Matilda (1102 – 1167), married
Henry IV’s son, Henry V (1086 – 1125). Some people easily look over this, but
Matilda did not have the title of empress for nothing, and she wasn’t happy
that for her second marriage she had to settle for a mere French count,
Geoffrey of Anjou. Had Henry V lived for 20 more years, then the “Anarchy”
would have taken a much more interesting turn with Swabian and Bavarian knights
causing mayhem in the Home Counties and the Midlands. Perhaps we would have had
German kings of England five and half centuries before we actually did, the
Hundred Years’ War would have been completely avoided and Shakespeare would
have written plays about kings called Otto and Conrad as well as, of course,
Henry.
Perhaps most importantly of all, both rulers are remembered
as highly significant in their respective countries. Their reigns are seen as turning
points, indeed the pivotal moment, in English and German medieval history
respectively – everything before them is inevitably seen in their shadow, and
everything afterwards flows from them. What the Battle of Hastings in 1066 is
to the English, Henry IV’s penance at Canossa in 1077 is to the Germans – they’re
the dates that every schoolchild knows (or at least is supposed to know) and
which you should never set your credit card PIN number to. If you ask the
average educated English person to name five memorable medieval kings, William the
Conqueror will almost certainly be one of them, and if you said the same to the
average educated German, they’d probably name Henry IV. And the period they
lived in was one of genuine cataclysmic change in both of their countries,
which was driven by many of the same forces – the rise of knights, the
proliferation of castles, a whole umbrella of economic and social changes and
of course the growing power and authority of the papacy. So why have they
normally been studied in isolation from each other?
You see, medieval political history has traditionally been written on national lines. English historians of medieval politics focus on England, German historians of medieval politics on Germany, French historians on France and so on. From the nineteenth century through to after WW2 this was very much the established way of doing things, though since the 1970s that has changed. Notably though, there are a lot more British and American historians of medieval Germany than there are German historians of medieval England. Nonetheless, this still means there’s traditionally been the presumption that Medieval English and medieval German history have very little to do with each other.
Still, national traditions
of scholarship leave a long shadow. As a result, until a few generations ago historical scholarship on Medieval English politics was shaped by the question that preoccupied the Victorians: why did
a powerful and centralised national monarchy that gave birth to the common law,
Parliament and ultimately Great Britain and the British Empire emerge.
Meanwhile, German historians, like their predecessors in the Imperial and
Weimar eras, still return to the opposite question: why did the German emperors
increasingly lose control so that Germany ended up a loose confederation of
squabbling principalities, suffered the tragedies of the Thirty Years’ War and
Napoleonic occupation and was only unified in 1871 by the iron will of
Bismarck. The Norman Conquest and the Penance of Canossa respectively
have traditionally been identified as key turning points for both.
What makes all of these traditional scholarly preoccupations important is that English historians have since the nineteenth century traditionally focused on the state, the law, bureaucracies, court cases and constitutional matters, and many still do. Since the 1950s and even more so since 1990, however, there has been a widespread interest among political historians of early and high medieval England in the social side of politics. There’s been a lot of work on lordship (personal power over people of lesser status), patronage networks, family relationships, aristocratic identity and stuff like that.
On the German side of things, historians increasingly from the 1920s onwards and overwhelmingly so since the end of WW2, have generally ignored the study of medieval government and administration (the Verfassungsgeschichte that was much more fashionable in the Imperial period) in favour of a way of looking at medieval politics that focuses on the personal relationships between the king/ emperor and the political community – ties of lordship, patronage, family and friendship. A successful medieval king wasn’t one who issued laws that dictated how things were to be run across the country, taxed his subjects rigorously, punished criminals with harsh justice and generally worked to increase the power of the central government and the bureaucracy against the nobility and other vested local interests. Rather, as German medievalists have tended to see it, a successful medieval king was one who worked hard to get all the nobles on the same page as him and be on as friendly terms with them as possible, play by the time-honoured “rules of the game” (to use Gerd Althoff’s phrase) of kingship and generally act like the just and gracious lord of his people. Kings who succeeded in all this could then achieve lots of stuff by bring the nobility of the kingdom/ empire together in royal assemblies and armies. German historiography also stresses the importance of ritual and symbolic actions in how this consensus was built up between kings and aristocrats, such as displays of anger, the shedding of tears, kneeling or prostrating oneself to ask for forgiveness, bringing in holy relics to court gatherings or army musters, seating plans at assemblies and feasts and the like. And yet people talk about "gesture politics" like its a new thing!
What this means is that, in more than just a literal sense,
English and German historians speak a very different language when it comes to
discussing medieval politics. As a result, it seems like the two political systems
of England and Germany in the middle ages were profoundly different and cannot
be understood in each other’s terms, making any kind of meaningful comparison
impossible. And on the surface of it, its easy to see this as just a natural
state of affairs because the actual content they work on is very different. Lets
turn to the two rulers we’re comparing. William the Conqueror was able to defeat
and kill a rival contender for the throne, Harold Godwinson, in one decisive
battle on 14 October 1066, and just over two months later he had seized control
of the effective capital of England (London) and with it the machinery of government
and was crowned king. Then over the next five years, he was able to completely subdue
the whole country by force and replace the majority of its ruling class with
foreigners loyal to him. By contrast, Henry IV faced betrayals, rebellions and
civil war for almost all his reign and temporarily lost all authority over his
kingdom when in 1076 the Pope released his subjects from their oaths of loyalty
to him. This he could only regain if he approached the pope as a humble
penitent begging for forgiveness. The sources are also hugely different. For
example the most famous document from Norman England is of course the Domesday Book – a government
survey of (almost) his entire kingdom that records land ownership, economic
activities, wealth, tax assessment and the (adult male) population. Likewise there are lots of writs and charters and other administrative records surviving from Norman England. There are plenty of detailed narrative histories for the Anglo-Norman period - Orderic Vitalis, William of Malmesbury, Henry of Huntingdon - but they're counterbalanced by these administrative records. Meanwhile,
Henry IV’s Germany is very different. While poor in administrative records it is rich in chronicles, many
of them written by historians hostile to Henry IV like Bruno of Merseburg and
Lamprecht of Hersfeld. These provide lots of "thick description" of rituals, assemblies and battles, but have little to say about the workings of government. Thus, in contrast to the Anglo-Norman case, they do so much more to colour how historians view the workings of politics in the period.
Thankfully, over the last fifty years, some historians,
almost all of them English and most of them specialising in Continental European
medieval history (though also including some intrepid and outgoing
Anglo-Saxonists) have tried hard to bridge the scholarly great divide and challenge
the insularity and historiographical navel-gazing of English and German
medievalists alike. To give a short list of them (in chronological order) they
include Karl Leyser, Timothy Reuter, Janet Nelson, Sarah Foot, Catherine Cubitt,
Simon MacLean, Charles Insley and Levi Roach. There’s been a lot of work
recently on the importance of just the kind of ritual and symbolic communication
stuff that German medievalists like Gerd Althoff focus on, in relation to late Anglo-Saxon
England, though Anglo-Normanists have been slower to follow up on this trend. Indeed
its frankly bizarre that its taken so long for English medievalists to see the
importance of demonstrative behaviour and symbolism in medieval kingship. After
all one of the most famous episodes in English medieval history opens with a
king throwing a tantrum and ends with the same king making a humble pilgrimage to
Canterbury and being whipped bloody by monks to apologise to the archbishop
whose death resulted from his anger. The whole saga of Henry II and Thomas
Becket makes a great deal more sense if you have in mind Henry IV at Canossa in
1077, or from an even earlier time Emperor Otto III in 1000 making a pilgrimage
to Gniezno to visit the tomb of the martyred Adalbert of Prague and greeting Duke
Boleslaw the Brave of Poland in the humble garb of a penitent. And
Anglo-Normanists have tried to look at the Norman Conquest in a more pan-European
perspective as well, as exemplified by work from people like David Bates,
Robert Bartlett, Stephen Baxter and (again) Levi Roach.
Canterbury 1174, when even the most old school historians finally realise that the politics of Norman and Angevin England weren't a ritual free-zone after all |
But enough of the historiographical detour. In my view,
William the Conqueror and Henry IV, while they mostly don’t match up,
nonetheless make a really stimulating comparison for thinking about how
eleventh century kingship worked (both through similarities and differences),
the momentous changes going on all over Europe and how events almost a thousand
years ago can still be so resonant and controversial today. In subsequent posts
we’ll be exploring both rulers’ childhoods, how they presented themselves as rulers
and faced challenges to their authority and how their reigns were shaped by
broader forces of change.
Sources cited
Primary
William of Poitiers, The Gesta Guillelmi, edited and
translated by Marjorie Chibnall, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998)
Secondary
Gerd Althoff, Family, Friends and Followers: Political
and Social Bonds in Early Medieval Europe, 500 – 1200, translated by
Christopher Carroll, Cambridge University Press (2009)
Elisabeth Van Houts, ‘The Norman Conquest through European
eyes’, English Historical Review 110 (1995)
Charles Insley, “‘Ottonians with pipe rolls?’ Political culture
and performance in the kingdom of the English, c.900 – 1050’”, History 102
(2017)
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